CYIL vol. 8 (2017)

KAROLINA WIERCZYŃSKA CYIL 8 ȍ2017Ȏ they are equal under international law. On the contrary, as the International Court of Justice noticed: “[T]he subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights, and their nature depends upon the needs of the community.” 11 The international personality of other than states entities is limited and determined by the powers vested in them; consequently the entity can have a legal personality of a very restricted kind, dependent on the status of such entity. Originally states as the only subjects of international law were the only persons capable of bearing the responsibility in international law for the violations of this law. But definitely the notion of international responsibility is no longer designated only to states. Clearly responsibility is connected with a legal personality of all the actors recognized as subjects of international law. On the one hand, the responsibility is an element of legal personality and, on the other, the consequence of such personality. However it must be noticed that international responsibility is not a uniform concept, and it cannot be attributable to all the subjects of international law without any modifications, although the general idea remains the same: international responsibility is a result and the consequence of violation of international law. If international law binds responsibility with legal personality, the simple assumption would be to claim that entities which are not classified as subjects of international law do not bear responsibility under international law. It would result in leaving the broad range of subjects outside the scope of international system of justice, even if the international crimes were committed. This poses an essential question in international law, whether responsibility could be (or should be?) attributed to other entities not being recognized as subjects of international law. Specifically this question shall be formulated vis-à-vis any terrorist groups as Al-Kaida, or more visibly the ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria). Those actors are not subjects of international law, they do not possess legal personality, but does this consequently mean that they do not have obligations, rights or duties under the system of international law? And consequently is the lack of legal personality an obstacle to justice? Another subsequently question that definitely shall be raised refers to the attribution of responsibility in the context of unmanned weapons, drones or other systems used by actors unrecognized in international law which contributed to breaches of international law and it should be formulated as follows: who is responsible for those crimes committed by autonomous weapon systems? Those questions will be addressed below in the parts relevant to state and individual responsibility. Responsibility of state or also of non-state actors? As already stated originally, responsibility was attributed solely to states, the capacity of individuals and organizations to incur responsibility was developed later. As James Crawford noticed: state responsibility is, so far, a paradigm form of responsibility on the international plane. 12 2.

11 Reparations for injuries suffered ., op. cit., p. 178. 12 CRAWFORD, J., The System of International Responsibility, in: J. Crawford, A. Pellet, S.Olleson (eds.), The Law of International Responsibility , Oxford University Press 2010, p. 17.

26