EU ANTITRUST: HOT TOPICS & NEXT STEPS

EU ANTITRUST: HOT TOPICS & NEXT STEPS 2022

Prague, Czechia

By comparison the fines imposed by the European Commission, in 2007–2009 on cartels were 76% of the relevant turnover on average (Connor, 2010). The optimal compensatory fine which assumes the probability of detection of 100% would then amount to 3% – 16% depending on the margin, overcharge and demand elasticity. The exact values can be found in the chart below. Tables 4-6: ε =0, α =1 k=0,05 k=0,13 k=0,2 ε =1, α =1 k=0,05 k=0,13 k=0,2 m=0,05 0,047619 0,115044 0,166667 m=0,05 0,045232 0,108747 0,156746 m=0,1 0,047619 0,115044 0,166667 m=0,1 0,043062 0,103023 0,147727 m=0,2 0,047619 0,115044 0,166667 m=0,2 0,039265 0,093005 0,131944

ε =2, α =1 k=0,05 k=0,13 k=0,2 m=0,05 0,04258 0,100238 0,140212 m=0,1 0,037999 0,086778 0,116162 m=0,2 0,029982 0,063223 0,074074

The basic amount of the deterrence fine which was calculated by the Office according to the new Sentencing Guidelines can now be compared with the optimal deterrence fine. In the chart below we see that today’s fines for the most serious anticompetitive conduct reach 4% – 25% of the optimal fine depending on the demand elasticity, margin and overcharge. These numbers are double those imposed according to the previous guidelines (Nováková, 2017, p. 56). Even though today’s data have limited relevance since we have not had enough cases yet, we can already conclude that the fines imposed increased significantly. In the BABY DIREKT case (which was excluded from the data set because of trade secrets), the Office imposed a fine of more than CZK 40 million which was the statutory limit of 10 % of net total turnover of the competitor. The fine calculated according to the new Sentencing Guidelines was thus even higher than that. Tables 7-9: e=0, α =0,15 k=0,05 k=0,13 k=0,2 m=0,05 0,158479 0,065597 0,04528 m=0,1 0,158479 0,065597 0,04528 m=0,2 0,158479 0,065597 0,04528

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