EU ANTITRUST: HOT TOPICS & NEXT STEPS

Prague, Czechia

EU ANTITRUST: HOT TOPICS & NEXT STEPS 2022

e=1, α =0,15 k=0,05

k=0,13

k=0,2

0,166842 0,069396 0,048145 0,175249 0,073252 0,051085 0,192198 0,081142 0,057195

m=0,05

m=0,1

m=0,2

e=2 ,α =0,15 k=0,05

k=0,13

k=0,2

0,177234 0,075287 0,053823

m=0,05

0,1986

0,086965 0,064966

m=0,1

m=0,2 0,251702 0,119366 0,101879 If we assumed the probability of detection to be 100%, the imposed fine would get close to the optimal compensatory fine able to at least take the cartel gain away from the cartelists. In the charts below we see that for overcharge k=0,05, the imposed fine was equal or even above the optimal level (probability of detection = 1). In case of k=0,2 the imposed fine amounted 30 – 67% of the optimal compensatory fine depending on the margin. Again, the numbers are double the fines imposed according to the previous guidelines (Nováková, 2017, p. 56). Tables 10-12: e=0, α =1 k=0,05 k=0,13 k=0,2 m=0,05 1,056525 0,437316 0,301864 m=0,1 1,056525 0,437316 0,301864 m=0,2 1,056525 0,437316 0,301864

e=1, α =1

k=0,05

k=0,13

k=0,2

1,112279 0,462639 0,32097 1,168327 0,488345 0,340565 1,281318 0,540946 0,381302

m=0,05

m=0,1

m=0,2

e=2, α =1

k=0,05

k=0,13

k=0,2

1,181558 0,501913 0,35882

m=0,05

1,324

0,579765 0,43311

m=0,1

m=0,2 1,678011 0,795772 0,679195 In case of bid rigging, which dominated in our data set, the imposed fine was way below optimal level (the imposed fine amounted to 6.66% of the optimal fine on average) which results from the presumed very low probability of detection (15%). If we presumed probability of detection to be 100%, the fines imposed

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