EU ANTITRUST: HOT TOPICS & NEXT STEPS

EU ANTITRUST: HOT TOPICS & NEXT STEPS 2022

Prague, Czechia

lodging of complaints. To that end, they should confirm the legitimate interest of workers. As for operationalisation capabilities, they exist despite being blurry. Legal uncertainty, caused by the inconsistency and unclarity of case law, is what impedes antitrust capabilities the most. To strengthen them, enforcers need to clarify three elements. First, they must recognize that workers can be harmed by labour market’s restrictions as such, even absent downstream effects. This may unlock private enforcement’s potential: naming workers as direct victims of the infringement could facilitate follow-on actions. When the focus remains on consumers, the benefits of an existing binding decision pale. Second, they should decide when and why labour restrictions are anticompetitive by object or by effect. Third, they should identify the market(s?) on which effects and exemptions will be assessed. To wrap up, European competition law could meet the worker welfare challenge. While private enforcement capabilities are limited, public enforcers have leeway to step-up intervention. Interest for the question is rising, and European competition law is probably at the dawn of clarification and evolutions. For enforcers, the goal is clear: their decisions must be affirmative and clear-cut. Litigants need clarity and predictability. References [1] American Antitrust Institute (2019). Letter to the DOJ . Available at: https://www. lieffcabraser.com/pdf/AAI_No-Poach_Letter_to_DOJ.pdf [2] Baker, J.B. (2019). Harms to Suppliers, Workers, and Platform Users, in: The Anti trust Paradigm: Restoring a Competitive Economy . Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. [3] Chopra, R., (2019). Dissenting Statement in the Matter of Your Therapy Source, LLC, Neeraj Jindal, and Sheri Yarbray – Commission File No. 1710134. [4] Conclusions of the Advocate General of 20 September 1995 in Bosman (C-415/93), EU:C:1995:293. [5] Corrected Statement of interest of the United States of America of the Department of Justice of 8 March 2019, Stigar v. Dough Dough, Inc., No. 2:18-CV-00244- SAB. [6] Commission Notice on the handling of complaints by the Commission under Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty, 2004, (2004/C 101/05). [7] Department of Justice Antitrust Division, Federal Trade Commission, 2016. Anti trust Guidance for Human Resource Professionals. [8] Decision of the Agencija za zaštitu tržišnog natjecanja of 14 November 2018, Koios , UP/I 034-03/18-01/009. [9] Decision of the Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato of 26 October 2016, Agenzie di modelle (I798).

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