HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER

demonstrate that this is not an inherent devaluation of communitarian dignity. Instead, our approach highlights a nuanced perspective where the individual’s dignity is not overlooked. Like those who came before us, we continue to seek better ways to resolve these conflicts, recognising that factors like historical context play a crucial role. This is particularly evident in the decisions of the German Constitutional Court, which must navigate the complex relationship between Germany and the concept of human dignity – a relationship that has often been fraught in its history. Nevertheless, we do not find this approach flawless. While we acknowledge the importance of historical legacies and the need to safeguard dignity, we emphasise that the dignity of the individual cannot be disregarded. Our analysis does not suggest that communitarian dignity should always be given greater weight. What concerns us is the lack of sufficient reasoning or resolution in the court’s treatment of the dignity versus-dignity conflict, which has gone unaddressed. Therefore, we urge courts in future cases to give greater consideration to individual dignity and to provide clear justifications for instances where it is deemed subordinate to communitarian dignity. This would not only lend greater legitimacy to their judgments but also prevent them from appearing paternalistic, offering clarity in cases such as Omega and Wackenheim, where the dignity of the individual was seemingly overshadowed.

31